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REMOVAL FROM STATE TO FEDERAL COURT UNDER
THE COLOR OF AUTHORITY PROVISION
New York v. Galamison
342 F.2d 255 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 977 (1965)
The Rev. Milton A. Galamison and nearly sixty other civil rights demon-
strators were protesting alleged nationwide discriminatory treatment of
Negroes. The State of New York prosecuted them for these acts which inter-
rupted subway and highway traffic to the New York World's Fair1 and the
defendants filed petitions to remove under the Civil Rights Removal Statute.?
Essentially, the defendants asserted that their acts of protest and resistance
were
"under color of authority" of one or more of three "law[s] provid-
ing for equal rights'--the guarantees of free speech and petition
embodied in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the equal protection clause of that amendment, and statutory pro-
tection of rights conferred by the Constitution, notably 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981 and 1983.8
As an alternative defendants argued that their refusal to comply with
police orders was "'on the ground that it would be inconsistent with' the
same three sets of laws." 4 The State moved to remand in each case and the
respective district courts granted the motions. The court of appeals, after
preliminarily deciding that such remand orders are appealable, 5 treated the
I For detailed accounts of the events preceding and subsequent to the arrests, see
N.Y. Times, April 19-29, 1964.
2 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1948) Civil Rights Removal:
Any of the following civil actions or criminal prosecutions, commenced in a
state court may be removed by the defendant to the district court of the United
States for the district and division embracing the place wherein it is pending:
(1) Against any person who is denied or cannot enforce in the courts of such
state a right under any law providing for the equal civil rights of citizens
of the United States, or of all persons within the jurisdiction thereof;
(2) For any act under color of authority derived from any law providing for
equal rights, or for refusing to do any act on the ground that it would
be inconsistent with such law.
3 New York v. Galamison, 342 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 977
(1965).
4 Ibid.
5 New York v. Galamison, supra note 3, at 257. Generally an order by a district
court remanding a case to a state court is not reviewable on appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d)
(1948) provides: "An order remanding a case to the State court from which it was
removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise." The interlocutory nature of such an
order and the time lost in reviewing such orders are the main reasons underlying the
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various cases as one and affirmed,8 holding that the color of authority provi-
sion7 did not apply because neither a generalized constitutional provision nor
a statute allowing for civil claims for deprivation of civil rights are laws con-
ferring color of authority within the meaning of the provision.
Although the question of who may invoke the color of authority provi-
sion was discussed, the court of appeals did not answer it s as another ground
was dispositive of the appealY Notwithstanding the other ground, the issue as
to who may remove under the provision would seem of equal importance and
logically should be decided first. For if the removing defendant is an improper
party under the provision's coverage, then needless to say, there is no reason
to consider the source of the alleged color of authority. Since there have been
no significant substantive changes in the provision since its enactment in
1866,10 the original statutory policy is still valid in determining those individ-
uals intended to be covered.
Section 1443(a), the color of authority provision, 'had its origin in sec-
tion 3 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.11 This section was patterned after
section 5 of the Habeas Corpus Act of 1863,12 which was aimed at providing
an opportunity to remove for federal officers and their agents. The removal
provisions were reenacted in subsequent years retaining substantially the same
statutory prohibition. Wright, Federal Courts 126 (1963). However, Congress in enact-
ing § 901 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 intended to permit review of such orders
where removal is sought pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Rights Removal Statute.
28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1964). Section 901 of the Civil Rights Removal Statute, 78 Stat.
241, 267 (1964), reads as follows: "An order remanding a case to the State court from
which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise, except that an order
remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed pursuant to section
1443 of this title shall be reviewable by appeal or otherwise." Notwithstanding the
enactment of § 901, Congress failed, inadvertently, to amend 28 U.S.C. § 1292
which confers appellate jurisdiction to courts of appeal on specific interlocutory orders.
Hence it is arguable that a court of appeals is still powerless to review remand orders
since § 1292 delimits the types of interlocutory orders reviewable. The court in the
principal case, however, was strongly influenced by the clear expression of congressional
intent, and reading the two sections in par materia treated § 901 as amending § 1292.
New York v. Galamison, supra note 3, at 257; 2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction
541 (1943).
6 New York v. Galamison, supra note 3.
7 For the purposes of this note § 1443(1) of title 28 of the U.S.C. will be referred to
as the denial provision and § 1443(2) will be referred to as the color of authority
provision.
8 New York v. Galamison, supra note 3, at 263.
9 For discussion of this other ground, see text accompanying note 21 infra.
10 For a general history of the Act, see Divan & Fieder, "The Federal Statutes-
Their History and Use," 22 Minn. L. Rev. 1008 (1938); Morse, "Civil Rights Removal:
The Letter Killeth, But the Spirit Giveth Life," 11 How. LJ. 149 (1965).
11 14 Stat. 27 (1866). The pertinent part of this statute is reproduced in the text
accompanying note 16 infra.
1 12 Stat. 755 (1863).
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import and phraseology.18 In 1948, when the provisions became sections
1443(1) and 1443(2) of title 28 of the U.S.C. the words "any officer, civil or
military or other person" were deleted from the color of authority provision.
Although, as the reviser's note indicates,14 this phraseology change was not
intended to change the substance of the provision, it clearly focused attention
on the scope and availability of the provision to a removing defendant.
The original color of authority provision in the Civil Rights Act of 186615
allowed removal of suits
against any officer, civil or military, or other person, for any arrest
or imprisonment, trespasses, or wrongs done or committed by virtue
or under color of authority derived from this act or the act establish-
ing a Bureau for the Relief of Freedmen....16
Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 gave the newly emancipated Negro
all civil rights consistent with citizenship. Section 2 made it a crime to deprive
persons of rights provided by the act. Following the removal provisions (sec-
tion 3), sections 4-10 were concerned with the arrest and prosecution of per-
sons committing the crimes defined in section 2. In section 5, federal commis-
sioners were authorized to appoint "suitable persons" to serve warrants and
permitted those appointees to "summon or call to their aid the bystanders or
posse comitatus." This portion of section 5, when read in conjunction with
the removal provisions and specifically the color of authority provision, pro-
vides strong indicia that "other person" in the color of authority provision was
meant to refer to those individuals in the categories enumerated in section 5:
those acting on behalf of federal officers in a quasi-official capacity. If Con-
gress had intended to include within section 1443(2) all individuals, it could
have used as it did in section 1443(1)-the denial clause-the words "any
person" instead of the less inclusive "officer ... or other person." A broader
reading of the provision would not be consistent with the statutory interpreta-
tion doctrine of ejusdem generis.
Perhaps the strongest reason for limiting the coverage of the provision to
federal officers and those acting on their behalf, is that such an interpretation
is peculiarly consistent with the purpose of the Act and the conditions that
brought it about. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 was enacted to provide the
Negro with all the rights of citizenship and to insure the realization of these
rights via federal enforcement and protection.17 Where state statutes or
Is See note 10 supra.
14 New York v. Galamison, supra note 3, at 263.
15 See note 11 supra.
16 Ibid.
17 "The primary purpose of this statute was to protect the members of the colored
race in the civil rights conferred upon them by the post Civil War amendments to the
federal Constitution (particularly the Fourteenth Amendment) and by the acts of
Congress passed in pursuance of these amendments. But the language of the statute is
much broader than this purpose, so that it applies to other state deprivation of civil
rights not involving the colored race." Dobie, Federal Procedure 390 (1928).
[Vol. 27
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constitutions denied the Negro of these rights and the Negro sought to chal-
lenge the validity of these laws, Congress (obviously apprehensive of the lack
of impartiality that existed in some state courts) gave the Negro the oppor-
tunity to remove. As a counterpart to the denial provision, the color of
authority provision gave federal officers and their agents the same oppor-
tunity when they were arrested or prosecuted in attempting to enforce the
provisions of the Act and to secure to the Negro his rights.' 8
With the relatively recent proliferation of civil rights litigation, coupled
with the unavailability of review of remand orders until the Civil Rights Act
of 1964,19 there understandably has been little interpretation of the color of
authority provision. In fact most litigation has involved the denial clause. In
addition, the legislative history behind section 901 of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,20 which permitted review of remand orders involving sections 1443 (1)
and 1443(2), indicates that Congress was mainly concerned with the cases
leading up to Kentucky v. Powers2 ' which held that removal under the denial
clause could only be obtained when a state constitutional provision or statute
prevented a defendant from exercising his civil rights. These decisions in-
volved predecessors of section 1443(1)-the denial provision-and not
1443 (2)-the color of authority provision. Hence there is nothing to indicate
that Congress was concerned about the latter section. Finally, two recent cases
have taken the view that 1443 (a) is limited solely to those individuals acting
in an official or quasi-official capacity.2 2
If this is the correct interpretation of who may invoke section 1443 (2),
then it would be necessary for an individual seeking to remove to demonstrate
at least a quasi-official capacity derived from a law providing for equal rights.
What in fact will constitute a quasi-official status for purposes of the provision
may give the courts some opportunity to broaden the coverage of the provi-
sion. However, if read in the light of the original purpose of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, the concept of quasi-official would seem to be specifically de-
limited to police-type enforcement behavior.
IS "The legislative sentiment of those supporting this act [Civil Rights Act of 1866J
likewise was to abate the fear that local hostilities and prejudice would operate in the
local state courts to the detriment of Union soldiers, judges, administrators and other
Union officials." Morse, "Civil Rights Removal: The Letter Killeth, But the Spirit
Giveth Life," supra note 10, at 153.
19 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
20 H.R. Rep. No. 974, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1963); 110 Cong. Rec. 6739 (daily ed.
April 6, 1964) (remarks by Senator Dodd).
21 201 U.S. 1 (1906).
22 In Peacock v. City of Greenwood, 347 F.2d 679 (5th Cir. 1965), sit-in demon-
strators were not allowed to invoke 1443(2) because they did not have the requisite
official or quasi-offical capacity, but were allowed to remove under 1443(1) since they
had alleged that a state statute was applied so as to deprive them of their equal rights.
Similarly, in City of Clarksdale v. Gertge, 237 F. Supp. 213 (NI). Miss. 1964), the
court stated at 220 in disposing of defendant's claim: "[Riemoval is not available under
subsection (2) [1443(2)] unless the act for which the state prosecution is brought was
done in at least a quasi-official capacity derived from a law providing for equal rights."
1966]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
The basis for affirming the remand orders in Galamison was that the
defendants' alleged source of "color of authority" (the fourteenth amendment
and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 1983) was not sufficient for 1443(2). The court
held that a removing defendant under 1443 (2)
must point to some law that directs or encourages him to act in a
certain manner, not merely to a generalized constitutional provision
that will give him a defense or to an equally general statute that
may impose civil or criminal liability on persons interfering with
him 23
This interpretation by the Galamison court is entirely consistent with the
proposition that the provision is only available to federal officers and their
agents.
However, irrespective of who may invoke the statute, it seems clear that
the Galamison formulation of what is a "law providing for equal rights" within
the context of the provision, is correct. When the provision was enacted in
1866, the derivation of color of authority was delimited to the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 and "the act establishing a Bureau for the relief of Freedmen and
Refugees . . . ." When section 3-the removal section--of the 1866 Act was
reenacted in 1875, it was placed in a distinct title, "The Judiciary" (title
XIII, section 641) and the source of color of authority was changed to read
"derived from any law providing for equal rights." Clearly this change could
not have been intended to open the door for removal where general constitu-
tional rights were concerned. The more reasonable interpretation would be
that the 1875 revisers were concerned with specific laws founded in egalitarian
terms,24 such as enumerated in section 3 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.25 In
fact, this same Reconstruction Congress demonstrated its awareness of the
distinction between specific laws dealing with civil rights and the general
rights secured by the Constitution when it separated the two in what is now
section 1343 (3), title 28 of U.S.C., which gives circuit courts original juris-
diction of suits for deprivation under the auspices of state authority "of any
right privilege or immunity, secured by the Constitution of the United States,
or any right secured by any law providing for equal rights of citizens of the
United States or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States.u 8
In Gibson v. Mississippi27 where removal had been sought under the
denial clause, it was claimed that a statute providing for the organization of
the grand jury was ex post facto as to the defendant. The Court held that this
was a constitutional issue and could not be raised under the civil rights re-
moval section. The inference to be drawn is that constitutional issues are
separate and distinct from those equal rights laws intended to be embodied in
the statute. The Courts' holding encompassed the color of authority provision
as well as the denial clause. The more recent Galamison interpretation was
23 New York v. Galamison, supra note 3, at 264.
24 Id. at 268.
25 See text accompanying note 16 supra.
26 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1964).
27 162 U.S. 565 (1896).
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followed in Peacock v. City of Greenwood,28 where the court refused to find
"color of authority" for removal purposes when the defendant merely alleged
the exercise of an equal civil right under the Constitution or laws of the
United States. In Forman v. City of Montgomery,29 the court held that a valid
defense to a crime for which a defendant is charged is not enough to confer
color of authority, rather a defendant must show a source which gives posi-
tive sanction to his behavior. There appear to be no decisions contrary to
Galamison on this issue.
The conclusions reached so far, namely that the color of authority provi-
sion is limited solely to federal officers and those acting in a quasi-official
capacity and, as to these individuals, they must derive such authority from a
specific law founded in egalitarian terms, would seem to suggest that as to the
defendants in this case and similar demonstrators, the color of authority provi-
sion is dead. The simple answer to such a logical inference, is that, as to them,
the color of authority provision was never alive.
Clearly the Congress in 1866 could not have anticipated the civil rights
revolution along with its attendant legal problems we are experiencing today.
Congress obviously felt that the removal opportunity under the denial clause
would be sufficient to protect the rights of the Negro. It is not clear, however,
that the denial clause is insufficient today in spite of the increase in litigation.
The defendants in Galamison, for example, disclaimed any reliance on the
denial clause,30 which may be invoked by "any" person. This was apparently
due to the fact that they could not allege the basis for removal under 1443 (1),
namely, that the trespass laws of New York were being enforced in a dis-
criminatory manner. 1 If these defendants were not being discriminated
against by state laws or their enforcement, then the danger Congress sought to
obviate by allowing removal, is not present and neither is the necessity for
removal. Simply stated the defendants were being prosecuted in a non-dis-
criminatory manner under non-discriminatory laws. If they had alleged32 that
the trespass statutes were discriminatory, as did the successful removing de-
fendant in Rachel v. Georgia,33 they could have removed under the denial
clause. The purpose of removal was stated in Strauder v. West Virginia:
34
8 See note 22 supra.
28 245 F. Supp. 17 (NJ). Ala. 1965). See also Board of Educ. v. City-Wide Comm.
for Integration, 342 F.2d 284 (2d Cir. 1965).
30 New York v. Galamison, supra note 3, at 258.
31 Under the formulation in Kentucky v. Powers, supra note 21, at 26, a defendant
seeking removal under the denial clause must allege that a denial of the rights arose
from some state "law, statute, ordinance, regulation or custom."
32 The Galamison court held that "a defendant seeking removal under that section
[§ 14431 does not have to prove preliminarily that he will prevail." New York v.
Galamison, supra note 3, at 261-62.
33 342 F.2d 336 (5th Cir. 1965). The court held that defendants, having been ar-
rested for violations of a Georgia anti-trespass statute, sufficiently alleged denial of
equal rights by asserting that requests to leave premises had been based on a policy of
racial discrimination in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
34 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
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A right or an immunity, whether enacted by the Constitution or only
guaranteed by it, even without any express delegation of power, may
be protected by Congress .... And one very efficient and appropriate
mode of extending such protection and securing to a party the enjoy-
ment of the right or immunity, is a law providing for the removal of
his case from a State court, in which the right is being denied by the
State law into a Federal court, where it will be upheld. This is an
ordinary mode of protecting rights and immunities conferred by the
Federal Constitution and laws. Sec. 641 [now section 1443 (1)] is
such a provision.3 5
The denial clause as indicated by the court is clearly consistent with the pur-
pose of removal and even today is adequate to effectuate the intention of
Congress to protect citizens from discriminatory state legislation and action.
The prognosis for removal under the color of authority provision is very
limited. Conceivably it may experience greater use as more federal legislation
is passed which provides for federal officers to assist in securing and protecting
the rights of citizens. For example, a federal registrar acting pursuant to the
Voting Rights Act of 1965,36 who is arrested by the state for such behavior,
would clearly come within the provision. It appears that the color of authority
provision is limited to this and similar situations. This conclusion is reinforced
by the fact that the denial clause is adequate to protect against discriminatory
state laws and practices. If removal is to be judicially expanded, it would be
more feasible via the denial clause, since any person may invoke it and what
constitutes denial by a state is acquiring a broader definition.3 7 Finally, the
alternative of legislative amendment is always available to Congress if it feels
that the existing provisions are not adequate nor desirable to accomodate the
9rage to remove." 38
35 Id. at 310.
86 79 Stat. 437 (1965).
87 For example, it has been suggested that the Supreme Court today would ac-
knowledge the right to removal under § 1443 (1) even where no legislative denial of rights
is shown. See Krieger, "Local Prejudice and Removal of Criminal Cases From State to
Federal Courts," 19 St. John's L. Rev. 43 (1944); Note, Local Prejudice in Criminal
Cases, 54 Harv. L. Rev. 679, 685-86 (1941). See also Hamm v. City of Rock HIll, 379
U.S. 306 (1964), 26 Ohio St. L.J. 659 (1965).
88 "Rage to Remove," Time Magazine, Oct. 30, 1964, p. 88.
